Regional integration has re-emerged as a central strategy for development across the Global South. From continental trade agreements in Africa to regional blocs in Latin America and Asia, political leaders have increasingly framed integration as a pathway toward economic transformation, collective self-reliance, and greater influence within the global economy. Yet across many of these contexts, the expansion of formal institutional frameworks has not been matched by equivalent levels of functional integration. Trade flows remain limited, mobility is uneven, and policy coordination often stalls at the level of political commitment.

Africa provides a particularly revealing case of this broader contradiction. Over the past two decades, the institutional architecture of continental integration has expanded significantly under the African Union, culminating in the establishment of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). Despite these developments, intra-African trade remains comparatively low, the free movement of persons is only partially implemented, and many regional initiatives struggle to move from formal agreement to sustained institutional practice. The persistence of fragmentation alongside institutional expansion raises a central question: why does integration remain limited despite sustained political commitment and institutional development?

This article approaches regional integration not as a normative objective, but as a contingent outcome shaped by competing political, economic, and institutional logics, including sovereignty, distributional conflict, and postcolonial state formation.

Existing explanations provide important but partial answers. Institutionalist accounts emphasize the constraints imposed by sovereignty norms and intergovernmental decision-making structures, which limit the authority of regional organizations (Murithi 2012; Chekol 2020). Political analyses highlight the role of domestic regimes, where executive dominance and weak institutional constraints shape the incentives of political elites (Posner and Young 2007; Cheeseman 2015). International political economy approaches point to global asymmetries, including debt regimes, capital flight, and trade distortions that constrain the policy space available to many developing economies (Ndikumana and Boyce 2011; Mkandawire 2010; Clapp 2012; Bown and Hillman 2019; Rodrik 2023).

However, while global asymmetries are significant, they do not operate independently of domestic institutional arrangements. Agricultural and industrial subsidy regimes in advanced economies influence global production incentives and price structures, often placing producers in developing regions at a structural disadvantage. Yet rather than acting as a primary cause of fragmentation, these distortions interact with domestic political and institutional dynamics by intensifying economic pressures and reinforcing incentives for protection. In contexts where integration is already constrained, external asymmetries deepen existing fragmentation rather than generate it independently.

While these approaches identify important dimensions of the problem, they often examine institutional, political, and global factors in isolation. Less attention has been devoted to how identity institutions, economic incentives, and political authority interact to reproduce fragmentation across multiple domains simultaneously. This gap points to a deeper issue of fractured social contract formation, in which citizens may experience the state as exclusionary, weakly reciprocal, or uneven in the distribution of public goods, thereby limiting the foundations of broader political solidarity.

This article argues that fragmentation should not be understood simply as a failure of institutional design or political will, but as a self-reinforcing political economy condition. Integration is constrained by the interaction of identity regimes, economic structures, and political authority, which together shape the incentives facing both citizens and political elites. To account for this, the paper develops a framework structured around three institutional domains: the emotional, economic, and social walls.

Fragmentation is defined here as a condition in which economic, political, and social interactions remain primarily organized within national boundaries despite the presence of formal regional integration frameworks. Empirically, this may be observed through limited intra-regional trade, restricted labor mobility, and weak policy coordination. Cohesion, by contrast, does not refer to a normative ideal of unity but to a condition of alignment across institutional domains, in which identity regimes, economic incentives, and political authority structures support cross-border cooperation and collective action.

Rather than treating integration as inherently desirable, this analysis examines the conditions under which it becomes politically and economically viable, recognizing competing logics of sovereignty, postcolonial state formation, and global economic asymmetries. Integration may in some contexts generate trade-offs with national policy autonomy, political stability, or domestic redistribution, and these tensions form part of the conditions under which integration succeeds or fails.

Within this perspective, fragmentation can be understood as an institutional equilibrium in which identity exclusion, economic insecurity, and political incentives reinforce one another across domains. By situating African integration within the broader dynamics of the global political economy, this article contributes to debates on regionalism, development, and postcolonial governance. It offers a conceptual framework that not only explains persistent fragmentation in Africa but also provides analytical leverage for understanding similar patterns across the Global South.

2. Fragmentation, Integration, and the Limits of Existing Explanations

Regional integration has long been central to African political thought and development strategy. From early Pan-Africanist arguments that political independence required economic coordination across newly independent states to the institutional evolution of the African Union, continental unity has been framed as a structural condition for economic sovereignty and long-term political stability (Nkrumah 1963). These ideas have informed the development of continental institutions, culminating in initiatives such as the African Continental Free Trade Area, which seeks to establish a single market for goods and services across the continent (African Union Commission 2021; UNECA 2023).

Despite this institutional expansion, integration outcomes remain uneven. Intra-African trade remains limited relative to other regions, the free movement of persons is only partially implemented, and many regional initiatives struggle to move from formal commitment to sustained institutional practice. This persistent gap between institutional ambition and functional outcomes has generated a range of explanations within political economy scholarship, each capturing important aspects of the problem while leaving its systemic character only partially addressed.

A first body of work emphasizes institutional constraints. Analyses of the African Union and regional organizations highlight how sovereignty norms and intergovernmental decision-making structures limit the authority of continental institutions and restrict their capacity to enforce collective agreements (Murithi 2012; Chekol 2020). From an institutional political economy perspective, such outcomes reflect how institutional arrangements structure incentives and patterns of cooperation among political actors (North 1990; Acemoglu and Robinson 2012). While this literature explains why formal institutions may remain weakly implemented, it tends to treat institutional design as the primary site of constraint, often abstracting from the broader social and political conditions within which these institutions operate.

A second strand focuses on domestic political institutions. Studies of African governance document how executive dominance, personal rule, and weak institutional constraints shape political incentives across many states (Posner and Young 2007; Cheeseman 2015). In such contexts, political elites may support integration rhetorically while limiting reforms that would redistribute authority or alter existing political equilibria. This literature highlights the central role of political incentives in shaping institutional outcomes, yet it often analyzes these incentives within national boundaries, with limited attention to how they interact with cross-border dynamics of identity, mobility, and economic exchange.

A third approach situates integration challenges within the global political economy. Research on dependency, international finance, and trade asymmetries emphasizes how debt regimes, capital flight, and unequal market structures constrain policy space in developing economies (Ndikumana and Boyce 2011; Mkandawire 2010). Agricultural and industrial subsidy regimes in advanced economies further shape global production incentives and price structures, often placing producers in developing regions at a structural disadvantage (Clapp 2012; Bown and Hillman 2019; Rodrik 2023). This perspective highlights the importance of external constraints, but risks attributing fragmentation primarily to global structures, thereby underestimating the role of domestic institutional configurations in mediating these effects.

Taken together, these approaches identify institutional, political, and global dimensions of Africa’s integration challenges. However, they tend to treat these domains as analytically distinct, focusing on individual mechanisms rather than their interaction. As a result, they provide partial explanations for what appears to be a systemic phenomenon. Fragmentation persists not only because institutions are weak, political incentives are misaligned, or global conditions are unfavorable, but because these factors interact in ways that reinforce one another across multiple levels simultaneously.

External economic structures illustrate this interaction clearly. Subsidy regimes in advanced economies influence global production incentives and market competitiveness, yet their effects are not uniform. They operate through domestic institutional arrangements by intensifying economic pressures and reinforcing political incentives for protection. In contexts where identity-based exclusion and political constraints already limit cooperation, such external pressures deepen fragmentation rather than generate it independently. This suggests that fragmentation cannot be fully explained by external asymmetries alone, but must be understood in relation to the domestic structures through which these asymmetries are experienced.

This article builds on institutional political economy to develop a more integrated framework. It conceptualizes fragmentation not simply as an outcome, but as a self-reinforcing institutional equilibrium produced through the interaction of three domains: identity regimes, economic structures, and political authority. Each domain captures a distinct dimension of constraint, but their effects are mutually reinforcing.

Citizenship regimes shape the boundaries of belonging and influence patterns of social trust (Manby 2016). Migration politics and economic competition structure access to markets and mobility (Adepoju 2006; Crush and Ramachandran 2010). Leadership structures and political authority shape the incentives for institutional reform (Posner and Young 2007; Cheeseman 2015). These domains correspond to what this article terms the emotional, economic, and social walls of integration.

By shifting the analytical focus from isolated constraints to systemic interaction, this framework provides a basis for understanding why integration initiatives may struggle to translate into functional outcomes. It also opens a comparative perspective, suggesting that similar patterns of formal integration coexisting with persistent fragmentation across the Global South may reflect common underlying dynamics rather than region-specific failures.

3. The Architecture of Fragmentation: The Three Walls Framework

Continental integration requires more than formal institutional agreements. It depends on the alignment of identity structures, economic incentives, and political authority that sustain cross-border cooperation. The persistence of fragmentation across African economies suggests that integration is constrained not by the absence of institutional frameworks alone, but by the interaction of deeper structural forces that shape incentives at multiple levels (UNECA 2023).

This section develops a framework that conceptualizes fragmentation as an institutional equilibrium produced through the interaction of three domains: identity regimes, economic structures, and political authority. These domains are referred to as the emotional, economic, and social walls of integration. Each wall reflects a distinct institutional constraint, yet their effects are mutually reinforcing. Fragmentation emerges not from any single barrier, but from the cumulative interaction of these domains in ways that stabilize separation rather than coordination.

This equilibrium can be understood as a self-reinforcing institutional configuration in which existing incentive structures reduce the likelihood of coordinated change across domains. In such a configuration, actors adapt to constraints in ways that reproduce them. Citizens adjust expectations and behavior in response to exclusionary institutions, firms operate within fragmented markets, and political elites respond to incentives that favor stability over transformation. Fragmentation persists because the costs of coordination across domains remain higher than the benefits under prevailing institutional conditions.

3.1 The Emotional Wall: Identity and the Boundaries of Belonging

The emotional wall refers to institutional arrangements that shape the boundaries of belonging within political communities. Citizenship regimes determine who is recognized as a member of the polity and who remains outside it. In many African states, citizenship continues to be defined primarily through descent-based principles, linking political membership to ancestry rather than residence or participation.

From an institutional political economy perspective, such definitions of membership structure patterns of trust, cooperation, and collective action. Where belonging is narrowly defined, social trust may remain limited, particularly across ethnic, regional, or national lines (Manby 2016). This reduces the willingness of citizens to support cross-border mobility, shared markets, or broader forms of regional cooperation.

Empirical research shows that exclusionary citizenship regimes can produce legal and political hierarchies and reinforce contestation over belonging (Manby 2016, 2018). More inclusive frameworks, by contrast, are associated with stronger indicators of social cohesion and institutional trust (Bertocchi et al. 2024).

Beyond formal legal definitions, the emotional wall also operates through informal norms and political narratives that define insiders and outsiders. These narratives shape expectations about reciprocity, fairness, and entitlement. Where individuals perceive outsiders as competitors or threats, support for policies that enable cross-border cooperation declines. In this sense, identity institutions do not only define membership; they structure the social conditions under which cooperation becomes politically feasible.

The emotional wall therefore constrains integration by weakening the social foundations required for cooperation. When identity institutions reinforce exclusion, they generate political environments in which cross-border coordination lacks legitimacy at the societal level.

3.2 The Economic Wall: Mobility, Markets, and Protection

The economic wall refers to the constraints that restrict mobility and economic cooperation across borders. Regional integration depends on the movement of goods, services, labor, and capital, yet these flows often encounter administrative, political, and social barriers (Adepoju 2006).

Cross-border mobility is frequently framed through narratives of economic competition. Migrants and traders may be perceived as competitors for employment, resources, or access to public services, particularly in contexts of economic insecurity (Crush and Ramachandran 2010). These perceptions shape political pressures for protectionist policies that restrict mobility and cross-border exchange.

This produces a structural contradiction. While regional agreements promote economic integration and mobility, domestic political dynamics often generate restrictions that limit their implementation. Informal barriers, including bureaucratic obstacles, selective enforcement, and harassment at border crossings, further reduce the effectiveness of formal integration initiatives (World Bank 2020).

At a deeper level, the economic wall reflects the relationship between market structure and political incentives. Fragmented markets limit opportunities for specialization, scale, and value chain development, reducing the material benefits of integration. At the same time, economic insecurity increases the political salience of protectionist narratives, reinforcing constraints on mobility and exchange.

The economic wall therefore operates not only as a material constraint but also as a political one. It links market fragmentation to political responses that further entrench it, creating conditions under which integration becomes economically uncertain and politically contested.

3.3 The Social Wall: Political Authority and Reform Incentives

The social wall refers to the distribution of political authority and the incentives shaping leadership behavior. Regional integration requires institutional reforms that may alter existing distributions of power, including policy coordination, regulatory harmonization, and the delegation of authority to supranational institutions.

In contexts where political authority is highly concentrated, such reforms may be perceived as politically costly. Leaders operating within systems characterized by executive dominance or limited institutional turnover may prioritize regime stability and domestic control over deeper forms of integration (Posner and Young 2007; Cheeseman 2015).

As a result, political elites may support integration rhetorically while limiting substantive reforms that could alter existing power structures. This dynamic contributes to the persistent gap between formal commitments and practical implementation observed across regional initiatives.

More broadly, the social wall reflects how political institutions mediate the translation of agreements into outcomes. Even where formal commitments exist, their implementation depends on whether political actors perceive reforms as compatible with their interests. Where integration threatens existing power arrangements, incentives for compliance weaken.

The social wall therefore constrains integration by limiting the political feasibility of coordinated institutional change across states.

3.4 The Fragmentation Feedback Loop

The emotional, economic, and social walls do not operate independently. Instead, they interact to form a self-reinforcing feedback loop that reproduces fragmentation across multiple institutional domains. Fragmentation therefore emerges not from a single constraint, but from the cumulative interaction of identity institutions, economic incentives, and political authority.

Citizenship regimes that narrow the boundaries of belonging weaken social trust and increase suspicion toward migrants and cross-border traders. These dynamics reinforce narratives of economic competition and social threat, generating political pressures for protectionist policies that restrict mobility and cross-border exchange.

Protectionist responses, in turn, strengthen political incentives for leaders to maintain existing institutional arrangements that prioritize domestic stability over regional coordination. Leadership structures may therefore preserve exclusionary citizenship regimes and restrictive economic practices, further reinforcing the boundaries of belonging.

This interaction produces a circular process in which identity exclusion, economic insecurity, and political incentives reinforce one another. Fragmentation becomes stabilized over time, not as a temporary outcome of policy failure, but as a durable institutional condition.

External economic structures can intensify this feedback loop. Global production asymmetries and subsidy regimes increase economic pressures in contexts where domestic markets are already constrained (Clapp 2012; Bown and Hillman 2019; Rodrik 2023). However, these forces operate through domestic institutional configurations, deepening fragmentation where internal barriers already exist rather than determining outcomes independently.

These dynamics are consistent with broader findings linking economic insecurity to protectionist political responses and institutional persistence (Rodrik 2023).

Fragmentation can therefore be understood as a self-reinforcing institutional equilibrium sustained through the continuous interaction of identity regimes, economic structures, and political authority. Where these domains remain misaligned, the system reproduces itself, making coordinated integration difficult even in the presence of formal institutional commitments.

4. Fragmentation in Practice: Identity, Markets, and Political Authority

The three-walls framework identifies institutional mechanisms through which fragmentation is reproduced across identity, markets, and political authority. These mechanisms can be observed across a range of African political and economic contexts. The cases presented here are not exhaustive but are selected to illustrate how the emotional, economic, and social walls operate in practice and how their interaction sustains fragmentation across domains.

Importantly, these cases are not presented as isolated examples, but as empirical manifestations of a broader institutional pattern. Each illustrates how constraints within one domain generate pressures in others, contributing to the reproduction of fragmentation over time.

4.1 Identity and the Politics of Belonging

Citizenship regimes provide a clear illustration of the emotional wall. Legal definitions of belonging shape access to political participation and influence patterns of social trust. Where citizenship is defined primarily through descent rather than residence, individuals without recognized genealogical ties to dominant groups may face exclusion despite long-standing economic and social integration.

Côte d’Ivoire provides a well-documented example. During the 1990s, the concept of ivoirité redefined national identity in increasingly restrictive terms, transforming ancestry into a criterion of political legitimacy. As Manby (2018) documents, these debates excluded long-term residents from citizenship rights and political participation, contributing to political polarization and conflict.

Similar tensions have appeared elsewhere. Disputes involving Ghanaian authorities and Nigerian traders in 2019–2020 illustrate how economic regulation can intersect with questions of belonging despite ECOWAS commitments to regional mobility (Agyeman and Setrana 2021). These disputes show that identity-based exclusion can extend beyond formal citizenship regimes into regulatory and economic practices, where access to markets becomes conditioned by perceived national belonging.

These dynamics illustrate how identity institutions weaken the social foundations of integration. When belonging is contested, political narratives divide populations along ethnic or national lines, reducing support for cross-border mobility and cooperation. At the same time, these narratives shape expectations about reciprocity and entitlement, reinforcing resistance to policies that facilitate regional exchange. This reflects the emotional wall, where exclusionary definitions of belonging constrain the development of trust necessary for sustained regional coordination.

4.2 Migration, Economic Competition, and Market Fragmentation

Migration politics provide a clear illustration of the economic wall. Regional integration depends on the movement of labor, goods, and services across borders, yet mobility frequently becomes politically contested.

South Africa offers a prominent example. As a major regional economic hub, it attracts migrants from across Southern Africa, while also experiencing repeated episodes of xenophobic violence. The 2008 attacks, documented by Crush and Ramachandran (2010), resulted in widespread displacement, and subsequent outbreaks in 2015 and 2019 demonstrate the persistence of these tensions. More recent mobilization, including Operation Dudula, reflects ongoing political contestation surrounding migration and employment (Crush 2022).

Policy responses further illustrate these dynamics. Nigeria’s temporary closure of land borders between 2019 and 2020 disrupted regional trade flows and highlighted the fragility of economic cooperation within West African integration frameworks (World Bank 2020). Such measures demonstrate how states may revert to unilateral protection when domestic economic pressures intensify.

These examples illustrate how economic insecurity translates into resistance to mobility and exchange. Perceptions of competition are not only responses to material conditions but are also shaped by political narratives that link economic opportunity to national protection. As these narratives gain traction, they legitimize policy choices that restrict mobility and fragment markets.

The economic wall therefore operates through both material constraints and political responses. Fragmented markets reduce the benefits of integration, while political reactions to economic insecurity further limit the expansion of cross-border exchange. This interaction reinforces conditions under which integration remains both economically uncertain and politically contested.

4.3 Political Authority and Reform Incentives

The social wall becomes visible through patterns of political authority and leadership incentives. Regional integration requires reforms that may alter the distribution of power within national political systems.

Uganda illustrates these dynamics. President Yoweri Museveni has remained in power since 1986, supported by constitutional changes that removed term and age limits. While Uganda maintains regional engagement, the concentration of executive authority has generated sustained debate regarding political accountability and institutional renewal (Cheeseman, Lynch, and Willis 2021).

Similar patterns appear elsewhere. Constitutional reforms in Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire in 2020 enabled incumbent leaders to extend their tenure, while political tensions in countries such as Senegal highlight the central role of executive authority in shaping institutional trajectories. These cases suggest that while institutional configurations vary, leadership incentives consistently shape the implementation of regional commitments.

These dynamics influence the feasibility of integration. Leaders may support regional initiatives rhetorically while resisting reforms that could redistribute authority or weaken established political networks. In such contexts, formal commitments to integration coexist with limited implementation.

The social wall therefore constrains integration by limiting the political feasibility of coordinated institutional change. It reflects the extent to which integration depends not only on formal agreements, but on the alignment of political incentives with the institutional changes those agreements require.

4.4 External Economic Pressures and Domestic Responses

External economic structures interact with domestic institutions to reinforce these dynamics. Global agricultural and industrial subsidy regimes provide a clear example.

Subsidy programs in advanced economies influence global production incentives and price structures. Policies such as the European Union’s Common Agricultural Policy and industrial policy initiatives in the United States reduce production costs for domestic producers and shape global commodity markets (Clapp 2012; Bown and Hillman 2019; Rodrik 2023).

These conditions affect domestic political dynamics. When producers face structural disadvantages, economic insecurity increases, reinforcing political narratives that favor protection and national economic defense. Such responses can translate into restrictions on trade, migration, and cross-border cooperation.

External economic asymmetries therefore interact with domestic institutional arrangements. Rather than acting as independent causes of fragmentation, they intensify existing constraints by reinforcing economic pressures and political incentives for protection. This interaction illustrates how external forces amplify the economic wall while remaining mediated by domestic institutional configurations.

4.5 Interaction and Systemic Fragmentation

Taken together, these cases illustrate how the emotional, economic, and social walls operate across different domains of political and economic life. Citizenship regimes shape the boundaries of belonging, migration politics reflect tensions surrounding economic competition, and leadership incentives shape the implementation of institutional reforms.

These dynamics do not operate in isolation. Identity exclusion weakens social trust and increases suspicion toward migrants. Economic insecurity reinforces protectionist responses that restrict mobility. Political incentives sustain institutional arrangements that reproduce these patterns.

Empirically, this interaction can be observed as a cumulative process. Identity-based exclusion contributes to perceptions of economic competition. These perceptions reinforce protectionist policies that restrict mobility and fragment markets. In turn, fragmented markets and constrained mobility strengthen political incentives for leaders to maintain existing institutional arrangements. Over time, these dynamics stabilize fragmentation across multiple domains.

Fragmentation therefore emerges from the interaction of internal institutional arrangements and external economic conditions rather than from a single constraint. The empirical patterns presented here are consistent with the theoretical framework developed in Section 3, illustrating how identity, markets, and political authority interact to sustain fragmentation across multiple levels.

At the same time, variation across cases suggests that the relative strength of each domain may differ across contexts. This variation highlights the potential for comparative analysis and underscores that fragmentation is not uniform, but shaped by context-specific configurations of identity, economic, and political factors.

This interaction reflects the fragmentation feedback loop, in which each domain reinforces the others and stabilizes fragmentation as an institutional equilibrium.

5. Implications: Rethinking Integration as a Political Economy Process

The preceding analysis suggests that continental integration must be understood as a political economy process rather than a purely institutional or technical project. Initiatives such as the African Continental Free Trade Area and regional mobility agreements provide formal structures for cooperation, but their effectiveness depends on the broader political and economic conditions within which they operate.

Importantly, this analysis does not treat regional integration as an inherent policy objective. Rather, it examines the conditions under which integration becomes politically and economically viable, recognizing that sovereignty, distributional conflicts, and institutional constraints may make fragmentation a stable or even rational outcome for political actors operating under given incentive structures.

The persistence of the emotional, economic, and social walls indicates that fragmentation reflects deeper political economy dynamics shaping identity, markets, and political authority. Integration therefore unfolds through the interaction of these forces rather than through institutional design alone. Institutional frameworks provide the formal architecture of cooperation, but their effectiveness depends on whether underlying social, economic, and political conditions generate incentives compatible with cross-border coordination.

5.1 Theoretical Implications: From Isolated Constraints to Systemic Interaction

The framework developed in this article contributes to institutional political economy by shifting the analytical focus from isolated constraints to systemic interaction. Existing approaches often identify institutional weakness, political incentives, or global asymmetries as primary explanations for limited integration. While each of these factors is important, treating them independently obscures the ways in which they reinforce one another.

By conceptualizing fragmentation as a self-reinforcing institutional equilibrium, this analysis highlights how identity regimes, economic structures, and political authority jointly shape outcomes. This perspective suggests that fragmentation should not be interpreted as a temporary deviation from integration, but as a stable configuration produced by interacting incentives across domains.

This shift has implications for how integration is studied comparatively. Rather than asking why integration fails in specific contexts, the framework suggests examining how different configurations of identity, economic, and political institutions produce varying degrees of fragmentation or coordination. In this sense, integration becomes one possible outcome among several, rather than the expected baseline.

5.2 Citizenship and the Institutional Foundations of Belonging

The emotional wall highlights the role of citizenship regimes in shaping the social foundations of regional cooperation. In many African states, citizenship continues to rely heavily on descent-based frameworks that define belonging through ancestry rather than residence or participation. While such systems reflect historical patterns of state formation, they can also narrow the boundaries of political membership and constrain the development of broader regional identities.

Comparative research suggests that more inclusive citizenship frameworks are associated with higher levels of social cohesion and institutional trust (Bertocchi, Dimico, and Tedeschi 2024). From the perspective developed in this article, such arrangements may increase the likelihood that cross-border mobility and cooperation are perceived as legitimate and politically acceptable.

However, expanding the boundaries of belonging involves political trade-offs. Changes to citizenship regimes may alter existing distributions of rights, access, and representation, and may therefore encounter resistance from actors seeking to preserve established institutional arrangements. These dynamics highlight that the weakening of the emotional wall is not a purely technical reform but a contested political process shaped by competing claims over membership and entitlement.

More broadly, this suggests that integration depends not only on institutional design but on the extent to which political communities are willing to extend the boundaries of belonging beyond national frameworks. Where such extensions are limited, integration may remain socially constrained even in the presence of formal agreements.

5.3 Economic Integration, Production, and Policy Space

The economic wall illustrates how economic insecurity and global market distortions shape attitudes toward regional cooperation. Initiatives such as the African Continental Free Trade Area aim to expand intra-African trade and support the development of regional value chains (World Bank 2020). Yet these initiatives operate within a global economic system characterized by structural asymmetries.

Agricultural and industrial subsidy regimes in advanced economies influence global production incentives and price structures (Clapp 2012; Bown and Hillman 2019; Rodrik 2023). Producers in African economies frequently compete in markets shaped by external state support, which can weaken domestic productive sectors and constrain development strategies.

At the same time, the capacity of states to respond to these conditions varies. In many advanced economies, subsidy regimes are supported by financial systems capable of expanding credit to strategic sectors (Wray 2015; Tooze 2018). By contrast, many African economies operate under tighter monetary and financial constraints, limiting their ability to finance industrial policy at comparable scale.

From this perspective, economic integration depends not only on trade liberalization but on the alignment of production structures, financial capacity, and political incentives. Where economic insecurity remains high, political actors may rationally favor protectionist responses over integration, reinforcing the economic wall.

This suggests that the economic feasibility of integration is closely tied to the distribution of productive capacity and the availability of policy space. Where these conditions remain uneven, integration may generate perceived risks rather than shared benefits, limiting its political viability.

5.4 Political Authority and Institutional Reform

The social wall highlights the role of political authority in shaping the incentives for integration. Regional cooperation often requires reforms that alter the distribution of power within and across states. In contexts where political authority is highly concentrated, such reforms may be perceived as politically costly.

Comparative research documents the persistence of executive dominance and extended leadership tenure in several African states (Posner and Young 2007; Cheeseman 2015). These institutional environments may reduce incentives for reforms that could redistribute authority or introduce greater institutional uncertainty.

At the same time, public opinion data indicate strong support for political accountability and constitutional limits on executive power (Afrobarometer 2023). These patterns suggest that the conditions shaping integration are not only institutional but also political, reflecting tensions between leadership incentives and broader societal preferences.

Integration therefore depends in part on whether political incentives align with the institutional changes required for coordination across states. Where such alignment is absent, formal commitments may coexist with limited implementation. This highlights that integration is contingent on political feasibility, not only on institutional design.

5.5 Integration as a Conditional and Comparative Outcome

Taken together, these implications suggest that continental integration cannot be understood as a linear or purely technical process. Its trajectory depends on the interaction of identity institutions, economic incentives, political authority, and global economic structures.

Citizenship regimes shape the boundaries of belonging and influence patterns of social trust. Economic conditions affect attitudes toward migration, trade, and cooperation. Leadership structures shape incentives for institutional reform. External economic structures influence production incentives and development trajectories.

When these elements reinforce one another, fragmentation may persist despite ambitious institutional initiatives. In such contexts, fragmentation is not simply a failure of policy, but the outcome of interacting constraints that stabilize existing arrangements.

The three-walls framework therefore provides a basis for understanding integration as a conditional outcome. It highlights how integration becomes more likely when identity, economic, and political domains align, and less likely when these domains remain in tension.

More broadly, this perspective suggests that the study of regional integration should move beyond institutional design toward a more comprehensive analysis of the political economy conditions that sustain or constrain cooperation across borders. It also opens a comparative research agenda, in which variation in integration outcomes across regions reflects differences in how these domains are configured rather than the presence or absence of institutional frameworks alone.

6. Conclusion

Continental integration has long been presented as a central objective of African political and economic development. From the period of decolonization to the establishment of the African Union and the African Continental Free Trade Area, successive initiatives have sought to deepen cooperation across states and strengthen the continent’s position in the global economy. Yet the persistence of fragmentation across political and economic domains indicates that institutional agreements alone have not produced the level of integration envisioned by earlier frameworks.

This article has examined fragmentation through a political economy framework structured around three interacting domains: identity regimes, economic structures, and political authority. These domains, conceptualized as the emotional, economic, and social walls, shape the conditions under which cooperation across borders becomes possible or constrained. Citizenship regimes influence the boundaries of belonging and the development of social trust. Economic conditions structure incentives surrounding mobility, trade, and market participation. Political authority shapes the willingness of elites to implement reforms associated with regional coordination.

The analysis has shown that these domains interact to produce a self-reinforcing dynamic. Identity exclusion can weaken social trust and increase suspicion toward migrants and cross-border exchange. Economic insecurity can strengthen political narratives that favor protection. Political incentives may reinforce institutional arrangements that limit reform. Together, these processes generate a feedback loop through which fragmentation is reproduced across multiple domains.

This perspective situates these dynamics within the broader context of the global political economy. External factors such as subsidy regimes and trade structures influence production incentives and economic stability, but their effects are mediated through domestic institutional configurations. Fragmentation therefore emerges from the interaction of internal and external forces rather than from a single determining factor.

Viewing fragmentation as an institutional equilibrium helps explain why integration initiatives often encounter persistent constraints. Regional agreements provide important institutional frameworks, but their effectiveness depends on the alignment of identity institutions, economic incentives, and political authority. Where such alignment is absent, institutional expansion may coexist with limited functional integration.

Importantly, this analysis does not treat regional integration as an inherent policy objective. Integration involves trade-offs related to sovereignty, distribution, and political authority, and may be resisted by both political actors and citizens under certain conditions. From this perspective, fragmentation may represent a stable or rational outcome given existing incentive structures.

The three-walls framework contributes to debates in comparative political economy by providing an integrated approach to analyzing fragmentation. Rather than attributing limited integration to institutional weakness or external constraints alone, it highlights the interaction of multiple domains that shape political behavior and economic opportunity. This perspective aligns with broader efforts in political economy to understand institutional outcomes as equilibrium configurations shaped by interacting constraints.

More broadly, this framework suggests that regional integration should be understood as a conditional and context-dependent process. Its trajectory depends on the alignment of social, economic, and political factors rather than on institutional design alone. Where these domains remain in tension, fragmentation is likely to persist despite formal commitments to cooperation. Where they align, the conditions for integration may emerge.

This perspective also opens a broader research agenda. Future work may examine how different configurations of identity regimes, economic structures, and political authority produce variation in integration outcomes across regions. Comparative analysis across the Global South may help identify the conditions under which fragmentation becomes more or less stable, as well as the mechanisms through which changes in one domain may alter the equilibrium of the system as a whole.

In this sense, integration is not a predefined endpoint but a contingent outcome shaped by the structure of incentives across interacting institutional domains.

Acknowledgments

The authors thank colleagues for helpful comments and discussions

Declaration of interest statement

The authors declare that they have no competing interests.

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